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DESIGN OF A DUAL FAULT TOLERANT
SPACE SHUTTLE PAYLOAD DEPLOYMENT ACTUATOR
DUANE R. TESKE*
ABSTRACT
As the Shuttle Transportation System (STS) becomes operational, the number and variety of
: payloads will increase. Th_ need to deploy these cargo elements will require a variety of unique actuator
designs, all of which will have to conform with STS safety policy.
For those missions where payload operations extend beyond the payload bay door envelope, this
policy deems the prevention of door closure as a catastrophic hazard. As such, it must be controlled by
independent, primary and back-up methods. The combination of these methods must be two-fault
to:erant.
This paper describes the deslgn of such an actuator. The device consists of a single linear ballscrew
w!th two ballnuts, each ballnut forming an independent actuator using the common ballscrew. The design
requirements, concept development, hardware configuration, and fault tolerance rationale are
highlighted.
INTRODUCTION
An Orbiter based satellite delivery system is presently under development. Comprising an upper
stage and associated airborne support structure, this system is carried "lying down" within the Orbiter
bay and raised from the bay for deployment, Figure 1. As the raised element extends beyond the payload
bay door envelope, failure could impede door closure and prevent safe return of the Orbiter. The actuator
system thus can cause a catastrophic hazard, raquiring control by independent primary and backup
methods, the combination of which must be two-failure tolerant. 1
PAYLOAD & SUPPORT STRUCTURE
45 o
Figure 1 Payload Deployment Schematic
*Sundstrand Energy Systems, Rockford, Illinois
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\CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
A survey of existing deployment systems was made to determine if any were adaptable to this
application. In general, dual fault tolerant capability is achieved by using two actuators.
I
The shortcoming of this approacl',, however, is the ability of a failed actuator to lock the entire drive
l train, defeating the backup unit. Either extra vehicular activity (EVA) or a disconnect mechanism, such as
! a pyrotechnic devioe,pinpuller or clutch is, therefore, lequlred. However, each device adds its reliability
" factor to the system _..ndincreases complexity. In addition, to prevent inadvertent disconnection cf the
'i healthy unit, either a method of discriminating the failed actuator must be devised,or a mechanism which
allows reliable reconnection must be conceived. Similarly, a retention/stowage device for the
disconnected unit is oftan required.
.: Existing ._ystems solve this problem in various ways, but with considerable proliferation of parts.
Further, such solutions usually result in a number of items or functions which cannot be allowed to fail.
These "noncredible" failure items are always the subject of debate and generally increase the precision
of manufacture required.
Nevertheless, in an attempt to _mproveexisting designs, several dual actuator design studies were
made. All the resulting concepts, however, offered o_-,lymarginal improvement. As a result, a single
actuator system which would possess the necessary fault tolerance was sought.
DESIGN DESCRIPTION
The singleactuatordesign concept which evolved is illustratedinFigure 2. The mechanism consists
of a linearballscrew upon which are mounted two independent ballnuts. Each ballnut is enclosed inits
own housing,forming, inessence, an independentactuator free to transita portionof the ballscrew. The
mountingarrangement of the actuator, Figure 3, is such that retracting the actuator raises the payload
and extending the actuator lowers it.
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Figure 2 Actuator Block Diagram
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Figure 3 Actuator Installation
Dual-faulttolerance is achieved by providingeach actuatorhalf withthe fullstroke necessary forthe
application. For normal operation, one ballnut is used to extend or retract the actuator, Figure 4. Two
independentmethodsof dnvingth_sIoallnutare provided,permftting full missionperformance even with
one failure.
PAYLOAD STOWED
PAYLOAD DEPLOYED
i
Figure 4 Normal Operating Sequence
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If a comb4natlon of two faduresi_l,obil_ze_ thi_ _r _,_atb-andbackup system, the second ballnui is
activated. Ttl,s portron of the actuator serves as an emergency stowing ur,Jtby paying out the additional
stroke length which _sstored wlth;n _tshousang Combanat_onsof failures which have resulted in either
failed fixed or failed free s_tuatlons in (he pnmary'loackLJpunit can be handled equally, Figure 5. The
emergency unit zsalso geared h_gherthan the p,lmary'backup to p-owde addlhonal force capabihty Jn
emergency situations. Thts arrangement thus possesses s_ng!efault tolerance w_threspect to fuifilhng
mission performance and dual fault tolerance _n('ontrolhng the catastrophic hazard.
FAILED FREE CASE
: "t
In addition, the number of single po,nt failure items which need "noncredible" status has been greatly
reduced. Most are controlled fn a straightforward fashion. Single load path items, using methodology
similar to that for the veha_,Jestructure, are designed for generous safety margins and sublected to
fracture analysis and control. Cr?ical rotating interfaces are provided with two independent rotating
surfaces. Single fastener attachm, his have two independent methods of retention.
Inspectionof the block diagram or.F_gure2, however, w_llreveal that jamm,ng of both ballnuts (twofailures) will render the mechanism inoperative, defeating the two fault tolerant phdosophy. Designfeatures employed to render this a noncred_blefailure mode include two _,dependent ball circuits in each
•j nut; fits,finishes, lubricahon, and materials which provide a calculated life well above the intended use;
• non-jamming w_person ballnut external ,_tertaces, plus adherence to a contamination control plan for
manufacture, assembly, and test. Small parts ,nternal to the actuator's housings are also retained or
captured to prevent their loosening and migrating to the ballnut interface. Based on over 21,000,000
hours of operation on similar Sundstrand ballscrew actuators, these controls perm=ta ballnut/ballscrew
assembly to be considered an mtnnsic s,ngle-fa,lure tolerant device.
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' TheresultingactuatorisillustratedinFigure6. Actualweightof_n_F,gl.neeringprototypeis15% less
.., thanthatcalculate,"for a comparahledualactuatorsystem.
SINGLE BALLSCREW
PRIMARY BALLNUT
; BALL CIRCUITS)
CLUTCH CARRIER--/
LENGTH:
EXTEND 1.54 M
RETRACT 1.17 M
STROKE 0.37 M
PRELOADED
WEIGHT:43 KG BELLEVILLE
SPRINGS
Figure 6 Actuator Cutaway
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Inadditiontothefaul!tolerancerequirements,otherperformanceissuesimposedesignconstraints,
manyoftenconflicting,Figure7. Forexample,stabilityinlaunchingthespacecraftisnecessarytoavoid
collisionwiththeairbomesupportstructure.This dictatesa lowbacklash,highstiffnessactuatorto
preventpitchoscillationsas thespececraP,pushesoft andexitsthe cargobay. Highstiffnessis also
-, desiredto preventdynamiccouplingof the cargoelementwiththeOrbiterthrustersduringpayload
erectionandstow.
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Safety
• Independent Primary and Backup Actuation Methods
_ • Combination of Primary and Backup Methods Must Be
: Two-Failure Tolerant
Operational
• Erect the Payload tu Any Angle From 0 ° to 45 oin Less Than
10 Minutes
• Maintain High Stiffness/Low Backlash to React Upper Stage
Separation at Any Angle
• Prevent Backdriving Under Load
• Maintain a Minimum Force Capability of 5340 Newtons Over
the Operating Environment
• Provide an Emergency Force Capability of 15,570 Newtons
• Limit th,- Maximum Force From Combined Impact Loads
and Actuator Output to a Level Compatible With Orbiter
Structure
• React Orbiter Vernier and Primary Reaction Control Leads
• Minimize Dynamic Coupling Between the Orbiter and the
Payload
• Minimize Telemetry and Monitoring Requirements to Perm;t
Minimal Crew Involvement
• Provide 10 Mission Life
Figure7 Requirements
However,dutingOrbiter;aunchandlanding,thevehiclewillbesubjectedtostructuraldeflectionsand
l vibrationenvironmentsthatcauserelativemotionbetweenthe two actuatormountingpoints.A stiff
. i actuatorinthissituationcanpotentiallyimpartundesirableloadsto thesupportingstructure.
The initialdesignsolutionwastoaccommodatethemotionthroughfree-wheelingof theunclu;ched
; . primary/backupballnut.However,therewas a degreeof uncertaintyas to theability,of the ballnutto
respondrapidlyenoughto attentuateloadsat higherf,equencies.Inaddition,a clutch-engagedfailure
occurringduringdeploymentcan defeatthisfeaturefor the subsequentlanding.
i"
Forthesereasons,a loadreliefdevicewasconceived,Figure8. Consistingof preloadedbellville
springs,thedevicepresentsa stiffactuatorup to 26,690 newtons(6,000 Ib) a_!alload,either
compressiveor tensile.Above26,690 newtons,deflectionof thedeviceaccommodatesthe relativ8
motionof themountswithoutoverloadingthestructure,Figure9.
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Preload= 26,6g0Newtons
Travel = 1.57 MM @ 37,810 Newtons
Figure 8 Load Relief Device
I 26,690 NEWTONS
TENSILE
:i
8 = 1.57 MM
DEFLECTION DEFLECTION
.!
COMPRESSIVE
: Figure 9 Load Vs. Deflection for Load Relief Device
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Fault tolerance considerations extended to the design of the load relief device. Spr!ngs were sized
such that adequate preload would remain after two spring failures.
The need for load relief is predicated on two factors, the ascent/descent vibration induced deflections
and the strength limitations of the mounting structure. Both of these areas incompletely defined at.
the time the actuator wa._designed. For that reason, the load relief device was designed to be modular,
permitting its easy removal if subsequent tests and analyses should indicate it to be unnecessary.
Competing requirements also arose in establishing the force vs. speed characteristics of the actuator.
In service, the actuator can be subjected to a variety of loads as illustrated in Figure 10. Because the
dynamics of the interaction between the cargo element and the Orbiter are complex, the precision with
which these loads could be defined was uncertain. In addition, the loads are bi-directional, capable of
either aiding or opposing actuator motion. Yet the actuator has to provide sufficient force capability to
perform at all credible load combinations. Operating force requirements of 0 to 1600 newton- (360 Ib),
which excursions to 15,520 newtons (3,500 Ib), were specified.
• Operating (On-Orbit)
m Vernier Reaction Control System
Primary Reaction Control System
- _ Dynamic
; -- Stop Impact at 450
-- Spacecraft Upper Stage Separation
• Nonoperating (Ascent/Descent)
--- Random Vibration
-- Shock
-- Structural Deflections
Figure 10 In-Service Loads
In providingsufficient force capability to satisfy these requirements, it was necessary, however, to
; limitthe maximumforce potential of the actuator so that the mechanism'soutputwould not exceed the
, strength of surrounding structure. This consideration limited the maximum actuator output to 37,810
newtons (8,500 Ib ).
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Ina similarmanner,establishingtheactuationspeedrequiredbalancingthedesireto deployina
reasonabletimewiththemaximuminsertionspe_d_.f theOrbiter'spayloadretentionlatchassemblies.
The combinationof thesespeedand forcerequJre_,entservedto definean acceptableoperating
envelopeasshowninFigure11.Theactuatordesignhadtosatisfythisenvelopeunderallcombinations
of supplyvoltages,environments,and manufacturingtolerances.
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Figure 11 Design OperatingEnvelope
STATUSAND CONCLUSION
Anengineeringprototypeispresently(November1984)undergoingperformancetesting.Asnoted,
thisunitis 15% lighterthanthe calculatedweightfor thecomparabledualactuatorsystem.
Moresignificantly,theactuatordesignhas passeda preliminaryNASASafety Review,a step
necessaryfor acceptanceas a Shuttlecargo.ThisSafety Reviewhas historicallyresultedin design
changesfordualactuatorsystems.=The relativesimplicityof thesingleactuatordesignandtheminimum
numberof noncrediblefailuresituationsfacilitatedthisacceptance.
Althoughthisdesignhasthedrawbackof requiringtheroomto accommodatea longmechanism,the
approachto faulttoleranceis an advantage.It offersa simpler,lightersystemwithconsiderable
performanceversatility.
REFERENCES
: 1. "Safety PolicyandRequirementsfor PayloadsUsingtheSpaceTransportationSystem",NHB
1700.7A,December1980, P. 2-4.
2. Hornyak,Stephen,"InherentProblemsin DesigningTwo FaultTolerantElectromechanical
Actuators",Proceedings18thAerospaceMechanismSymposium,May1984,NASAConference
Publication2311,
313
p,
1985025199-316
